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INTRODUCTION
On October 14, 1995, Phillip Lacoste was driving his car with his wife
and two children down Old Gentilly Road in New Orleans when a truck
traveling in the opposite direction attempted to turn and instead struck
Lacoste’s vehicle.1 Barry Crochet was driving the truck, smelling of
alcohol and visibly intoxicated.2 Crochet told Lacoste that he was working
and that he would not wait for the police to arrive because police had
previously cited him for driving while intoxicated (“DWI”).3 The question
the court had to answer was whether Crochet’s employer, Kelley
Completion Services, was vicariously liable for any punitive damages the
tortfeasor owed to the Lacoste family.4
In 2015, the same issue of vicarious liability for punitive damages
arose from a starkly different situation.5 Steven and Leslie Gillespie sued
the School Board in which their young daughter was a student.6 The
Gillespie’s daughter had sexual encounters with her teacher, Lance
Duhon.7 Duhon had a questionable past, yet the School Board still
employed him in a position of authority over young children.8 The court
in Gillespie had to determine whether the School Board was vicariously
liable for the punitive damages Duhon owed to the Gillespie family.9
Both the Lacoste and Gillespie courts decided the issue of vicarious
liability for punitive damages, but both decisions seem incompatible with
the facts.10 In Lacoste, the court held an employer, who did not appear to
be at fault, vicariously liable for punitive damages.11 In Gillespie,
however, another court did not hold an employer who exercised poor
judgment vicariously liable for punitive damages.12 These two cases
highlight the circuit split between Louisiana appellate courts as to whether
Copyright 2019, by THOMAS C. NAQUIN.
1. Lacoste v. Crochet, 751 So. 2d 998, 1000–01 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See generally Gillespie v. Calcasieu Par. Sch. Bd., 179 So. 3d 966 (La.
Ct. App. 2015), writ denied, 187 So. 3d 470 (La. 2016).
6. Id. at 970.
7. Id.
8. Id. Duhon had been previously investigated for sexual misconduct with a
student.
9. Id.
10. Lacoste v. Crochet, 751 So. 2d 998 (La. Ct. App. 2000). But see Gillespie,
179 So. 3d 966.
11. See generally Crochet, 751 So. 2d 998.
12. See generally Gillespie, 179 So. 3d 966.
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a court may hold an employer vicariously liable for compensatory
damages and punitive damages arising from the same incident.13 The
Louisiana Supreme Court has not expressed its view on the issue,14 and
the laws that separately provide for vicarious liability and punitive
damages make no mention of one another, resulting in ambiguity as to
whether an employer can be vicariously liable for punitive damages.15
Despite the circuit split, however, several Louisiana appellate courts and
federal district courts have found employers not vicariously liable for
punitive damages.16
The current circuit split creates ambiguity in the law, causing
confusion for both individuals and employers questioning potential rights
or liability.17 To remedy this ambiguity, the Louisiana Supreme Court
should clarify the issue of vicarious liability for punitive damages but
continue to adhere to the traditional civilian viewpoint that disfavors
punitive damages.18 The Louisiana Supreme Court should find that
Louisiana courts generally cannot hold employers vicariously liable for
punitive damages. In certain scenarios in which the employer is especially
complicit in the injury-causing activity, however, it would be appropriate

13. See discussion infra Part II.
14. Berg v. Zummo, 786 So. 2d 708, 718 n.6 (La. 2001).
15. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320 (2019) (making no mention of punitive
damages); see also id. art. 2315.4 (making no mention of vicarious liability).
16. See, e.g., Smith v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 95-3004, 1996 WL 537746
(E.D. La. Sept. 20, 1996); see also Romero v. Clarendon Am. Ins., 54 So. 3d 789
(La. Ct. App. 2010), writ denied, 62 So. 3d 96 (La. 2011) (Third Circuit finding
no vicarious liability for punitive damages); Lankford v. Nat’l Carriers Inc., No.
12-01280, 2015 WL 518736 (W.D. La. Feb. 6, 2015); Phelps v. Daimler Trucks
N. Am., LLC, No. 13-6685, 2015 WL 12564180 (E.D. La. June 26, 2015);
Gillespie, 179 So. 3d at 970 (Third Circuit finding no vicarious liability for
punitive damages). But see Curtis v. Rome, 735 So. 2d 822, 826 (La. Ct. App.
1999), writ denied sub nom. Rambo v. Rome, 748 So. 2d 441 (La. 1999) (Fourth
Circuit finding the employer vicariously liable for punitive damages); see also
Levet v. Calais & Sons, Inc., 514 So. 2d 153, 159 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (Fifth
Circuit assessing punitive damages against the employer, but not addressing the
issue directly since the employer stipulated vicarious liability for all damages).
17. See Lacoste v. Crochet, 751 So. 2d 998 (La. Ct. App. 2000). But see
Gillespie, 179 So. 3d 966.
18. John W. deGravelles & J. Neale deGravelles, Louisiana Punitive
Damages - A Conflict of Traditions, 70 LA. L. REV. 579, 580 (2010) (“The
prevailing and longstanding rule in modern civil law is that punitive damages
violate the purpose behind the law of damages, which is to ‘repair the harm
sustained by the victim of a wrong, and not to punish the wrongdoer.’”).
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for employers to be vicariously liable for both the compensatory and
punitive damages assessed as a result of the employee’s direct actions.
Part I of this Comment generally discusses punitive damages and
vicarious liability in Louisiana. Part II demonstrates the nature of the
circuit split and the confusion surrounding the issue of vicarious liability
for punitive damages. Part III of this Comment explores the potential
solutions that the Louisiana Supreme Court could implement to address
the issue of vicarious liability for punitive damages. Part IV lays out a clear
direction for the Court to take when making its decision and defines an
approach that would typically find employers not vicariously liable for
punitive damages, but reserves a more nuanced analysis for particularly
culpable employers.
I. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AS LAGNIAPPE LIABILITY IN LOUISIANA
In actions arising from tortious conduct, damages can be divided by
purpose:19 (1) to give compensation; and (2) to punish wrongdoers and
deter wrongful conduct.20 Courts award compensatory damages to
compensate and restore a person to the financial position that he “would
have occupied had no tort been committed.”21 Punitive damages,22 by
contrast, are designed to “punish the person doing the wrongful act” and
to prevent similar conduct in the future.23
A. The Restrictive Nature of Punitive Damages in Louisiana
Louisiana statutory and codal authorities that allow recovery of
punitive damages share the goal of deterrence.24 Punitive damages are a
“supra-compensatory remedy,” meaning that courts award them in

19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
20. Id. See also id. § 901 cmt. a (“[T]he law of torts attempts primarily to put
an injured person in a position as nearly as possible equivalent to his position prior
to the tort.”). See also id. § 901 cmt. c (“Finally, unlike the law of contracts or of
restitution, the law of torts, which was once scarcely separable from the criminal
law, has within it elements of punishment or deterrence. In certain types of cases
punitive damages can be awarded . . . .”).
21. Id. § 903 cmt. a.
22. Punitive damages are also known as exemplary damages, as they mean to
make an example of the culpable party. Id. § 908 cmt. a.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Bourque v. Bailey, 643 So. 2d 236, 23839 (La. Ct. App. 1994),
writ denied, 648 So. 2d 392 (La. 1994).
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addition to compensatory damages.25 Although most states allow for
punitive damages in situations involving malice or recklessness,26 other
states restrict punitive damages to specific and narrow circumstances. 27
Louisiana falls into the latter category, allowing for punitive damages only
in the narrowest of circumstances.28 Louisiana law allows an award of
punitive damages expressly authorized by statute.29 Moreover, when
awarding punitive damages in Louisiana, courts must narrowly construe
statutes providing for punitive damages.30
In Louisiana, courts may assess punitive damages against a defendant
only when a statute so authorizes,31 such as when a defendant does any of
the following: (1) causes damage to another as a result of his intoxication
while operating a motor vehicle;32 (2) causes damage to another as a result
of criminal sexual activity when the victim was seventeen years old or
younger;33 (3) “intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other person to
intercept, disclose, or use [the] communications” of another;34 (4) sells,

25. Catherine M. Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages: Theory,
Empirics, and Doctrine, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS
486 (Jennifer Allen ed., 2013).
26. See CHAD MARCHAND & MEADE MITCHELL, DAMAGES: A STATE BY
STATE SUMMARY 158 (2014). For example, Michigan does not allow for the
recovery of punitive damages to punish defendants but does allow exemplary
damages in certain scenarios. See also Kewin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295
N.W.2d 50, 55 (1980) (“An award of exemplary damages is considered proper if it
compensates a plaintiff for the ‘humiliation, sense of outrage, and indignity’
resulting from injuries ‘maliciously, wilfully [sic] and wantonly’ inflicted by the
defendant.”).
27. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (2018) (“No punitive damages
shall be awarded in any action, unless otherwise provided by statute.”); Boott
Mills v. Boston & M.R.R., 106 N.E. 680, 683–84 (1914) (“It is only by express
statute that [punitive] damages may be awarded.”); McCoy v. Ark. Nat. Gas Co.,
143 So. 383, 38586 (La. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 661 (1932) (“There is no
authority in the law of Louisiana for allowing punitive damages in any case,
unless it be for some particular wrong for which a statute expressly authorizes the
imposition of some such penalty.”).
28. See McCoy, 143 So. at 38586,
29. See id. See also, e.g., Bailey, 643 So. 2d at 238.
30. See McCoy, 143 So. at 38586; Bailey, 643 So. 2d at 238.
31. See McCoy, 143 So. at 38586; Bailey, 643 So. 2d at 238. See also LA.
CIV. CODE art. 2315.4 (2019); id. art. 2315.7; id. art. 2315.3; LA. REV. STAT. §
15:1312 (2019); id. § 9:2800.76.
32. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.4.
33. Id. art. 2315.7.
34. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:1312.
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distributes, or “participate[s] in the marketing of an illegal controlled
substance . . . in wanton or reckless disregard for the rights, health, and safety
of others”;35 (5) causes injuries to another through an act involving juvenile
pornography;36 or (6) causes death “by a wanton and reckless disregard for
the rights and safety of the victim through an act of hazing . . . .”37
Louisiana law also offers recovery through statutes that provide double
or treble damages beyond the actual loss sustained.38 As double and treble
damage statutes provide damages greater than mere compensation, double
or treble damage statutes may be punitive in nature39 but are not a “supracompensatory remedy” like standard punitive damages.40 Because double
or treble damage statutes are not a “supra-compensatory remedy,”41 one
should not consider double or treble damage statutes traditional sources of
punitive damages.
Louisiana’s hesitance to embrace punitive damages is apparent in the
discretionary nature of awarding punitive damages.42 Even if the plaintiff
proves all of the elements of a statute providing punitive damages, the trier
of fact has complete discretion in awarding punitive damages.43 Louisiana’s
restriction of punitive damages also reflects civil law jurisdictions’ general
disfavor of punitive damages.44 “[T]he prevailing and longstanding rule in
modern civil law is that punitive damages violate the purpose behind the law
of damages,” which is not to punish the wrongdoer, but merely to repair the
damage caused to the victim.45 Continental European countries with civilian
legal traditions generally reject punitive damages as a source of recovery.46
35. Id. § 9:2800.76.
36. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.3.
37. Id. art. 2315.10.
38. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 3:4278.1 (providing damages for landowners
whose trees were intentionally cut down in the amount of three times market price).
39. Id.
40. Sharkey, supra note 25, at 486.
41. Id.
42. See deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 18, at 596 (discussing that
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.4 allows punitive damages to be awarded but at
the discretion of the trier of fact); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.7 (providing that
punitive damages may be awarded); LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.76 (providing that
punitive damages may be awarded); but see id. § 15:1312 (providing that plaintiffs
under this statute are entitled to recover, among other things, punitive damages).
43. See supra note 42.
44. deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 18, at 580.
45. Id.
46. See Helmut Koziol, Punitive Damages-A European Perspective, 68 LA. L.
REV. 741, 750 (2008) (“The Principles of the Study Group on a European Civil
Code, the Swiss and the Austrian draft, also do not accept punitive damages.”);
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Article 10:101 of the Principles of European Tort Law states: “Damages
are a money payment to compensate the victim, that is to say, to restore
him, so far as money can, to the position he would have been if the wrong
complained of had not been committed.”47 Further, the European Group
on Tort Law rejects punitive damages because they disproportionately
reward the injured compared to his loss.48 Indeed, the civilian tradition’s
disfavor of punitive damages is so strong that European rulings have even
influenced the United States Supreme Court to restrict punitive damages
domestically.49
B. Louisiana Vicarious Liability Under Article 2320
The doctrine of vicarious liability allows courts to hold parties
responsible for the acts of third parties over whom they possess a certain
level of authority.50 Vicarious liability often arises under the theory of
respondeat superior, that is, an employer–employee relationship.51 An
employer may be responsible for the acts of his employees because an
employer acts through its principals and employees.52 Respondeat superior
liability attaches to the employer when the employee breaches a duty to a
third party while acting in the course and scope of his employment.53
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 823, translation at https://
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#p0027 [https://perm
a.cc/3QAB-VLNL] (“A person who, intentionally or negligently, unlawfully injures
the life, body, health, freedom, property or another right of another person is liable
to make compensation to the other party for the damage arising from this.”).
47. EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW:
TEXT AND COMMENTARY 8 (Springer-Verlag/Wien 2005).
48. Id. at 15051.
49. Michael L. Wells, A Common Lawyer’s Perspective on the European
Perspective on Punitive Damages, 70 LA. L. REV. 557, 559 (2010). See, e.g., Philip
Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007) (“[T]his Court has found that
the Constitution imposes certain limits, in respect both to procedures for awarding
punitive damages and to amounts forbidden as ‘grossly excessive.’”); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 408–09 (2003) (“Compensatory
damages are intended to redress a plaintiff’s concrete loss, while punitive damages
are aimed at the different purposes of deterrence and retribution. The Due Process
Clause prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a
tortfeasor.”).
50. RICK J. NORMAN, Louisiana Employment Law, in LOUISIANA PRACTICE
SERIES § 14:3 (2017).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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Louisiana Civil Code article 2320 establishes vicarious liability for
employers.54 During a vicarious liability analysis, a court determines
whether an employee was in the course and scope of employment when
the damage occurred;55 if so, the court may hold the employer vicariously
liable for the damage that occurred.56 To determine whether an employee
was in the course and scope of his employment, the court considers
whether an employee’s conduct is “so closely connected in time, place and
causation to his employment duties as to be regarded as a risk of harm
fairly attributable to the employer’s business . . . .”57 If the course-andscope requirement is met, the employer is solidarily liable for any
compensatory damages that the employee may owe to the plaintiff.58 As
vicarious liability is a type of strict liability, the culpability of the employer
is irrelevant.59 An employer’s liability is predicated solely on whether an
employee committed an act within the course and scope of employment.60
54. Louisiana Civil Code article 2320 provides, in pertinent part:
Masters and employers are answerable for the damage occasioned by
their servants and overseers, in the exercise of the functions in which
they are employed . . . . In the above case[], responsibility only attaches,
when the masters or employers . . . might have prevented the act which
caused the damage, and have not done it.
See also LA. REV. STAT. 9:3921 (2019) (“[E]very master or employer is
answerable for the damage occasioned by his servant or employee in the exercise
of the functions in which they are employed.”).
55. A court determines whether an employee was in the course and scope of
employment as follows:
An employer is liable for the negligence of his employee which is
committed in the course and scope of his employment. Such negligence
is in the course and scope of employment if it is so closely connected in
time, place and causation to his employment duties as to be regarded as
a risk of harm fairly attributable to the employer’s business, as compared
with conduct motivated by purely personal considerations entirely
outside the employer’s business.
H. ALSTON JOHNSON, III, CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, in 18 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE § 16:4 (3d ed. 2017).
56. Id. § 14:3.
57. Id. § 16:4 (emphasis omitted).
58. Sampay v. Morton Salt Co., 395 So. 2d 326 (La. 1981) (finding that
employers and employees are not joint tortfeasors but solidary obligors). When
multiple obligors are solidarily liable for a single debt, each of the obligors is
liable for the whole amount of the debt. For a discussion on solidary liability, see
JOHNSON, III, supra note 55, § 7.41.
59. JOHNSON, III, supra note 55, § 14:3.
60. See Morton Salt Co., 395 So. 2d at 328 (finding that vicarious liability is
imposed upon an employer without regard to the employer’s negligence or fault).
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The relationship between punitive damages and vicarious liability arises
when an employee causes injury by an act that is proscribed by one of the
several punitive damages statutes while in the course and scope of his
employment.61 In the resulting lawsuit, the plaintiff may seek punitive
damages from the employee as provided by statute, but may also seek to
recover punitive damages from the employer through vicarious liability.62
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: A GUMBO OF ANALYSES
The Louisiana Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether
Louisiana Civil Code article 2320, which provides for vicarious liability,
applies to punitive damages.63 The Court has acknowledged the issue of
vicarious liability for punitive damages, but it has declined to comment on
the merits of either side of the argument, expressing “no view on whether
punitive damages can be imposed against [an employer] who is vicariously
liable for general damages resulting from the conduct of an [employee].”64
In the absence of a Louisiana Supreme Court determination, Louisiana
circuit courts of appeal and federal district courts have reached
inconsistent results when deciding whether employers are vicariously
liable for punitive damages.65
A. The Louisiana Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal
Two state appellate courts have found employers vicariously liable for
punitive damages under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.4, which
permits punitive awards when a defendant’s intoxicated driving causes
damage.66 One such case is Levet v. Calais & Sons, Inc., decided by the
Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in 1987.67 In Levet, the Fifth
Circuit assessed whether punitive damages should be imposed on the

61. See McCoy v. Ark. Nat. Gas Co., 143 So. 383, 38586 (La. 1932);
Bourque v. Bailey, 643 So. 2d 236, 238 (La. Ct. App. 1994). See also LA. CIV.
CODE art. 2315.4 (2019); id. art. 2315.7; id. art. 2315.3; LA. REV. STAT. § 15:1312
(2019); id. § 9:2800.76.
62. See, e.g., Lacoste v. Crochet, 751 So. 2d 998, 1000–01 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
63. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320.
64. Berg v. Zummo, 786 So. 2d 708, 718 n.6 (La. 2001) (“We express no
view on whether punitive damages can be imposed against a party who is
vicariously liable for general damages resulting from the conduct of an intoxicated
person, such as an employer.”).
65. See supra note 16.
66. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.4.
67. Levet v. Calais & Sons, Inc., 514 So. 2d 153 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
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employer, but was precluded from directly deciding the issue because the
employer had stipulated vicarious liability for all damages, including
punitive damages.68 The Fifth Circuit did observe, however, that the
employer’s liability was justified because the employer purchased the
alcohol that the employee consumed on his drive home from work.69 The
court thus gave credence to using employer’s culpability as a factor when
deciding whether to impose punitive damages on the employer.70
In Curtis v. Rome,71 the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal
found an intoxicated defendant’s employer vicariously liable for punitive
damages arising from a car crash the employee caused.72 In Curtis, the
defendant was intoxicated at least in part because he consumed alcohol his
employer provided, which weighed in favor of the court finding vicarious
liability for punitive damages.73 Thus, the Fourth Circuit incorporated a
factual inquiry into its analysis of the culpability of the employer in order
to determine whether the employer was vicariously liable for punitive
damages.74
One year later, the Fourth Circuit in Lacoste v. Crochet held that “an
intoxicated driver’s employer, when held vicariously liable for damages
caused by the driver, may be cast for [punitive] damages under article
2315.4.”75 The members of the Lacoste family were injured in the accident
and filed suit against Crochet, the tortfeasor, and his employer, Kelley
Completion Services, to recover compensation for injuries sustained and
punitive damages because an intoxicated driver-employee caused the
injuries.76 The trial court held Kelley Completion Services vicariously
liable for the punitive damages that arose from Crochet’s conduct.77 In
Lacoste, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling even though
68. Id. at 158 (“As we view our duty in the present case, it is not to judge, as
we are urged by the defendants, the philosophical pros and cons of assessing
exemplary damages against one whose only liability for the injuries sustained is
vicarious.”).
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. Curtis v. Rome, 735 So. 2d 822 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (Fourth Circuit
finding the employer vicariously liable for punitive damages), writ denied sub
nom. Rambo v. Rome, 748 So. 2d 441 (La. 1999).
72. Id. at 826.
73. Id. at 824 n.3.
74. Id. at 826.
75. Lacoste v. Crochet, 751 So. 2d 998, 100304 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
76. Id. Punitive damages are allowed in cases in which an intoxicated driver
caused the damage. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.4 (2019).
77. Crochet, 751 So. 2d at 1006.

2019]

COMMENT

1219

the employer had no part in the employee’s action.78 Although the
employee had a previous DWI, the facts of the case do not state if Crochet
committed the DWI offense while employed for Kelley Completion
Services.79
In Lacoste, the employer lacked culpability for the actions of its
employee, but the court, relying on Curtis, nevertheless found vicarious
liability for punitive damages.80 The Lacoste analysis is distinguishable
from the Fourth Circuit’s analyses in Levet and Curtis because in Lacoste,
the court conducted no factual inquiry into the culpability of the
employer.81 Instead, the court relied on the precedent set in Curtis and
found vicarious liability using a strict liability standard.82
B. The Louisiana Third Circuit and the United States District Courts for
the Eastern and Western Districts of Louisiana
Opposite the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, one Louisiana appellate court
and two federal district courts in Louisiana have not extended vicarious
liability to punitive damages.83 When the issue of vicarious liability for
punitive damages came before Louisiana’s Third Circuit, the court took a
unique approach.84 In Gillespie v. Calcasieu School Board, Steven and
78. Id. at 1000–01. The court does not relay facts that suggest the employer
was aware of the employee’s conduct. See id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id. (finding vicarious liability based upon precedent). But see Levet v.
Calais & Sons, Inc., 514 So. 2d 153 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (observing the culpability
of the employer in the specific instance); Curtis v. Rome, 735 So. 2d 822 (La. Ct.
App. 1999) (reasoning that the employer deserved to be held vicariously liable for
punitive damages because of the specific conduct of the employer).
82. Crochet, 751 So. 2d at 100304.
83. See Smith v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 95-3004, 1996 WL 537746, at *2
(E.D. La. Sept. 20, 1996) (“Considering these general principles, and the lack of
any relevant Louisiana jurisprudence holding an employer liable under this
particular statute, [Defendant] is entitled to summary judgment, dismissing the
claims for exemplary damages as provided in Article 2315.4.”); Lankford v. Nat’l
Carriers Inc., No. 12-01280, 2015 WL 518736, at *3 (W.D. La. Feb. 6, 2015)
(“Thus, [article 2315.4] does not allow the imposition of punitive damages against
persons who are vicariously liable such as the employer in this case.”); Phelps v.
Daimler Trucks N. Am., LLC, No. 13-6685, 2015 WL 12564180, at *1 (E.D. La.
2015) (noting that a recent decision “supports the finding that employers may not
be held vicariously liable under art. 2315.4”); Gillespie v. Calcasieu Par. Sch. Bd.,
179 So. 3d 966, 970 (La. Ct. App. 2015), writ denied, 187 So. 3d 470 (La. 2016).
84. Gillespie, 179 So. 3d 966.
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Leslie Gillespie filed suit on their own behalf and on behalf of their minor
daughter against a teacher who engaged in sexual conduct with their
daughter, and against the School Board that employed the teacher.85 The
suit they filed against the School Board sought both compensatory and
punitive damages under the theory of vicarious liability.86
When the minor child was a student at Sam Houston High School,
teacher Lance Duhon engaged in a sexual relationship with her.87 Duhon
allegedly sent sexually explicit text messages to the child, soliciting her to
“meet him in his classroom to engage in improper, illegal and sexual acts
including, but not limited to, having her perform oral sex on him.”88 The
teacher’s solicitations and the subsequent acts allegedly occurred on an
“almost daily basis for a number of months.”89 In addition to compensatory
damages, the Gillespies sought punitive damages under Louisiana Civil
Code article 2315.3, which allows punitive damages in cases of child
pornography.90
Prior to his employment at Sam Houston High School, Duhon worked
at Barbe High School in Calcasieu Parish.91 In 2007, the Calcasieu School
Board launched an investigation into Duhon’s conduct with a student at
Barbe, resulting in the decision not to renew Duhon’s contract.92 Duhon,
when applying to work at Sam Houston High School in 2012, disclosed
the prior investigation for sexual misconduct to the principal of Sam
Houston.93 The principal of Sam Houston contacted the principal at Barbe,
who confirmed that the Calcasieu School Board investigated Duhon for
sexual misconduct with a 15-year-old female student and that “she would
not rehire him as the result of those incidents.”94 The principal of Barbe,
concerned about the possibility of Duhon being hired at another school
within the same school district, called the Head of High Schools for the
Calcasieu Parish school system to inform him of Duhon’s sexual

85. Id at 967.
86. Id. at 966.
87. Id. at 967.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.3 (2019) (“[E]xemplary damages
may be awarded upon proof that the injuries on which the action is based were
caused by a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of the person
through an act of pornography involving juveniles . . . regardless of whether the
defendant was prosecuted for his acts.”).
91. Gillespie, 179 So. 3d at 968.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 974 (Cooks, J., concurring).
94. Id.
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misconduct.95 Nevertheless, the principal of Sam Houston hired Duhon,
and the School Superintendent personally approved the hiring decision.96
Despite the evidence of the School Board’s recklessness and culpable
behavior in the hiring of Duhon, the Third Circuit found that the Calcasieu
Parish School Board was not vicariously liable for the punitive damages
arising out of Duhon’s conduct.97
In Gillespie,98 the Third Circuit held that the Calcasieu School Board
was not vicariously liable for its teacher’s sexual misconduct and that
Louisiana Civil Code article 2320 was completely inapplicable to punitive
damages—meaning that vicarious liability for punitive damages does not
exist in Louisiana.99 The Gillespie court reasoned that because vicarious
liability under article 2320 imposes solidary liability,100 the court should
interpret the article similarly to article 2324, which imposes solidary
liability on co-conspirators.101 The court determined that because solidary
liability under Louisiana Civil Code article 2324 is inapplicable to the
disposition of punitive damages,102 the solidary liability imposed under
article 2320 should be inapplicable to punitive damages as well.103 In
applying its reasoning, however, the Gillespie court did not consider the
individual culpability of the employer.104
In Romero v. Clarendon American Insurance, the Third Circuit again
found no vicarious liability for punitive damages under Civil Code article
95. Id.
96. Id. (“Duhon intentionally falsified, under oath, the required statement on
the sexual misconduct disclosure form required by the School Board. Having
previously investigated Duhon, the School Board knew the statement was false
but re-hired Duhon anyway.”).
97. Id. at 966 (Amy, J., majority op.).
98. Id. at 970; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.7 (2019) (providing that
punitive damages may be awarded in cases where the damages were caused by
criminal sexual activity when the victim is seventeen years of age or younger).
99. Gillespie, 179 So. 3d at 970.
100. Sampay v. Morton Salt Co., 395 So. 2d 326 (La. 1981) (finding that
employers and employees are not joint tortfeasors but solidary obligors). When
multiple obligors are solidarily liable for a single debt, each of the obligors is
liable for the whole amount of the debt. For a discussion on solidary liability, see
SAUL LITVINOFF & RONALD J. SCALISE JR., LAW OF OBLIGATIONS, in 5
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE § 7.41 (2d ed. 2017).
101. Gillespie, 179 So. 3d at 971. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2324 (“He who
conspires with another person to commit an intentional or willful act is
answerable, in solido, with that person, for the damage caused by such act.”).
102. Ross v. Conoco, Inc., 828 So. 2d 546, 553 (La. 2002).
103. Gillespie, 179 So. 3d at 971.
104. See id.
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2315.4 for an accident caused by an intoxicated driver.105 The court’s
analysis, however, was more nuanced than merely finding article 2320
inapplicable to punitive damages.106 The court held that the employer
could not be vicariously liable for any punitive damages unless the
employer contributed to the wrongful conduct.107 Thus, the Third Circuit
observed that vicarious liability for punitive damages should depend, at
least partly, on the culpability of the employer.108
The United States District Courts for the Eastern and Western Districts
of Louisiana have produced outcomes similar to the Third Circuit, but for
different reasons.109 In Lankford v. National Carriers Inc., the Western
District of Louisiana found no vicarious liability for the employer of an
intoxicated driver because of Louisiana’s strong public policy against
punitive damages.110 Later in the same year that Lankford was decided, the
Eastern District of Louisiana decided Phelps v. Daimler Trucks North
America L.L.C., a case also involving the employer of an intoxicated
driver.111 The court in Phelps cited Lankford and, using the same
reasoning, found no vicarious liability for punitive damages.112 The
reasoning in Lankford and Phelps would not allow vicarious liability for

105. Romero v. Clarendon Am. Ins., 54 So. 3d 789 (La. Ct. App. 2010); see
also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.4.
106. See Clarendon Am. Ins., 54 So. 3d 789. But see Gillespie, 179 So. 3d 966.
107. Clarendon Am. Ins., 54 So. 3d at 792.
108. Id.
109. See Smith v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 95-30004, 1996 WL 537746, at *2
(E.D. La. Sept. 20, 1996) (“Considering these general principles, and the lack of
any relevant Louisiana jurisprudence holding an employer liable under this
particular statute, [Defendant] is entitled to summary judgment, dismissing the
claims for exemplary damages as provided in Article 2315.4.”); Lankford v. Nat’l
Carriers Inc., No. 12-01280, 2015 WL 518736, at *3 (W.D. La. Feb. 6, 2015)
(“Thus, [article 2315.4] does not allow the imposition of punitive damages against
persons who are vicariously liable such as the employer in this case.”); Phelps v.
Daimler Trucks N. Am., LLC, No. 13-6695, 2015 WL 12564180, at *1 (E.D. La.
June 26, 2015) (noting that a recent decision “supports the finding that employers
may not be held vicariously liable under art. 2315.4”).
110. Nat’l Carriers Inc., 2015 WL 518736, at *3 (“Thus, [article 2315.4] does
not allow the imposition of punitive damages against persons who are vicariously
liable such as the employer in this case.”).
111. See Phelps, 2015 WL 12564180, at *1.
112. Id.
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punitive damages in any situation113 because of the traditional disdain that
civilian jurisdictions have for punitive damages.114
Because of the lack of relevant legislation addressing whether courts
may assess punitive damages vicariously,115 the Louisiana Supreme Court’s
reluctance to rule squarely on the issue,116 the differing interpretations of
article 2320, the various sources of law that provide avenues for recovery of
punitive damages,117 and the inclusion of policies for and against punitive
damages,118 Louisiana courts have rendered inconsistent decisions based
upon a wide array of reasoning.119 The current circuit split concerning
whether a court may hold an employer vicariously liable for punitive
damages has created an ambiguous area of the law.120
III. LAISSEZ LES BONNES IDÉES ROULER:121 POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS FOR
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The Louisiana Supreme Court could solve the current circuit split
regarding vicarious liability for punitive damages by rendering a clear
decision on the matter. When doing so, the Court should adopt a standard
113. See Nat’l Carriers Inc., 2015 WL 518736. But see Daimler Trucks N.
Am., LLC, 2015 WL 12564180.
114. See deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 18, at 580 (“The prevailing
and longstanding rule in modern civil law is that punitive damages violate the
purpose behind the law of damages, which is to ‘repair the harm sustained by the
victim of a wrong, and not to punish the wrongdoer.’”).
115. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320 (2019) (making no mention of punitive
damages); see also, e.g., id. art. 2315.4 (making no mention of vicarious liability).
116. Berg v. Zummo, 786 So. 2d 708, 718 n.6 (La. 2001) (“We express no
view on whether punitive damages can be imposed against a party who is
vicariously liable for general damages resulting from the conduct of an intoxicated
person, such as an employer.”).
117. See supra notes 36–39.
118. See, e.g., Nat’l Carriers Inc., 2015 WL 518736; Daimler Trucks N. Am.,
LLC, 2015 WL 12564180. But see Curtis v. Rome, 735 So. 2d 822 (La. Ct. App.
1999), writ denied sub nom. Rambo v. Rome, 748 So. 2d 441 (La. 1999).
119. See supra note 16.
120. See Lacoste v. Crochet, 751 So. 2d 998 (La. Ct. App. 2000). But see
Gillespie v. Calcasieu Par. Sch. Bd., 179 So. 3d 966 (La. Ct. App. 2015), writ
denied, 187 So. 3d 470 (La. 2016).
121. This phrase, translating to “Let the Good Ideas Roll,” is a play on the
popular Louisiana phrase “laissez les bons temps rouler,” or “let the good times
roll.” See Bailey Johnson, Laissez les bons temp rouler!: Learn your Mardi Gras
history, CBS NEWS (Mar. 8, 2011), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/laissez-lesbon-temps-rouler-learn-your-mardi-gras-history/ [https://perma.cc/8YKG-FGKY].
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that all Louisiana courts could apply during a vicarious liability analysis
for the assessment of punitive damages.
A. A Strict Liability Standard
Some jurisdictions in the U.S. use a strict liability approach for
vicarious liability, holding employers vicariously liable for punitive
damages regardless of the employer’s culpability.122 The strict liability
approach is identical to the one courts use to determine vicarious liability
for compensatory damages.123 The strict liability analysis is permissive of
the allowance of punitive damages, allowing vicarious liability any time
the employee commits the wrongful act during the course and scope of
employment.124
A strict liability approach to vicarious liability for punitive damages
punishes an employer for employing an individual.125 Conducting a
vicarious liability analysis for punitive damages without considering the
individual culpability of the employer is misguided because the aim of
punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer and deter bad conduct.126

122. W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 13 (1984). The
following states use a strict liability standard when assessing vicarious liability for
punitive damages: Alabama, Avondale Mills v. Bryant, 63 So. 932 (Ala. Ct. App.
1913); Arizona, Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc., 31 P.3d 114, 115 (Ariz. 2001)
(en banc); Arkansas, Ray Dodge, Inc. v. Moore, 479 S.W.2d 518 (Ark. 1972);
Georgia, Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc. v. General Warehouse No. 2, 149 S.E.2d 72
(Ga. 1966); Indiana, Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 362 N.E.2d 845 (Ind.
1977); Kentucky, Liberty Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Gruenberger, 477 S.W.2d 503,
505 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972); Maine, Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202 (Me.
1869); Michigan, Lucas v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 56 N.W. 1039 (Mich. 1893);
Mississippi, Sandifer Oil Co. v. Drew, 71 So. 2d 752 (Miss. 1954); Missouri,
Johnson v. Allen, 448 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); Montana, Rickman v.
Safeway Stores, 227 P.2d 607 (Mont. 1951); North Carolina, Hairston v. Atlantic
Greyhound Corp., 18 S.E.2d 166 (N.C. 1942); Oklahoma, Bierman v. Aramark
Refreshment Servs., Inc., 198 P.3d 877, 879 (Okla. 2008); Oregon, Stroud v.
Denny’s Restaurant, Inc., 532 P.2d 790 (Or. 1975) (en banc); Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia Traction Co. v. Orbann, 12 A. 816 (Pa. 1888); South Carolina, Hooper
v. Hulto, 158 S.E. 726 (S.C. 1931); Tennessee, Odom v. Gray, 508 S.W.2d 526
(Tenn. 1974).
123. NORMAN, supra note 50, § 14:3.
124. Id.
125. A strict liability analysis has no bearing on culpability. See, e.g., Sampay
v. Morton Salt Co., 395 So. 2d 326 (La. 1981) (finding that vicarious liability is
imposed upon an employer without regard to the employer’s negligence or fault).
126. KEETON, supra note 122, at 9.
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Holding an employer vicariously liable regardless of culpability does not
punish the wrongdoer, but rather the employer of the wrongdoer solely
because of his employment.127 Most actions in employment scenarios that
result in punitive damages stem from an employee’s personal decision,
which usually is not in furtherance of the employer’s interest.128 A court
should not hold an employer responsible for the punitive damages arising
from strictly personal decisions that an employee makes, especially when
a court will hold the employer vicariously liable for compensatory
damages of the plaintiff.129
A strict liability approach, however, would force employers to “exercise
closer control” over employees, which would ideally result in more
responsible employees.130 Although a strict liability standard would
incentivize employers to carefully select employees based upon character, it
loosens the control that employers have over potential liability employees
cause.131 Under a strict liability standard, if an employee commits an act
within the course and scope of employment, the employer has no way to avoid
liability, no matter the employee’s motivation or the employer’s culpability
for the action.132 As a result of the employer’s blanket liability under the strict
liability approach, punitive damage awards are no longer consistent with the
penal purpose of punishing the culpable party.133 Additionally, such
punishment may have negative economic repercussions.134 For businesses,
especially corporations, large punitive awards can translate to financial harm
for companies and shareholders.135 Although punitive damages are insurable
127. See OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 84 (1881) (“[T]he party
whose voluntary conduct has caused the damage should suffer, rather than one
who has had no share in producing it.”).
128. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.4 (2019) (punishing defendants who
make the personal decision to drive while intoxicated and ultimately cause injury
to another).
129. KEETON, supra note 122, at 9.
130. Id. at 13.
131. Under a strict liability standard, an employer would be vicariously liable
for punitive damages in every single instance that the employee causes damages.
Language in Louisiana Civil Code article 2320 places liability on the employer only
if he could have prevented the harm, but courts have generally read that language
out of the article. Moreover, Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:3921, which addresses
vicarious liability and follows Louisiana Civil Code article 2320, makes no mention
of the “might have prevented” language. NORMAN, supra note 50, § 14:3.
132. See generally id.
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
134. Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., On the Determinants and
Importance of Punitive Damage Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 527 (1999).
135. Id.
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when vicariously assessed in Louisiana, they are often subject to exclusion
clauses in insurance policies.136 As a result, some employers may be left
with no way to insure against an assessment of punitive damages.137
B. The Restatement of Torts Solution
Although some jurisdictions use strict liability to determine vicarious
liability and give no weight to an employer’s culpability, the majority of
jurisdictions in the U.S. hold employers vicariously liable for punitive
damages only if the employer meets specific criteria of culpability.138 The
Second Restatement of Torts provides the criteria such jurisdictions use.139
All of the criteria of culpability provided in the Restatement are not
intended to “apply to the interpretation of special statutes such as those
giving double damages, as to which no statement is made.”140 The Second
Restatement of Torts states that a court can properly award punitive
damages against an employer for damages an employee causes if:
(a) the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and
136. See, e.g., Taylor v. Lumar, 612 So. 2d 798 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
137. Id.
138. KEETON, supra note 122, at 12. The following states follow the
Restatement of Torts when assessing vicarious liability for punitive damages:
California, White v. Ultramar, Inc., 981 P.2d 944, 952 (Cal. 1999); Colorado, Frick
v. Abell, 602 P.2d 852 (Colo. 1979); Connecticut, Maisenbacker v. Society
Concordia of Danbury, 42 A. 67 (Conn. 1899); Florida, Mercury Motors Exp., Inc.
v. Smith, 393 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1981); Hawaii, Lauer v. YMCA, 557 P.2d 1334 (Haw.
1976); Idaho, Openshaw v. Oregon Auto Ins. Co., 487 P.2d 929 (Idaho 1971);
Illinois, Holda v. Kane Cty., 410 N.E.2d 552 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Iowa, Briner v.
Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858 (Iowa 1983); Kansas, Smith v. Printup, 866 P.2d 985, 990
(Kan. 1993); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(2) (West Supp. 2018);
Nevada, Summa Corp. v. Greenspun, 607 P.2d 569 (Nev. 1980); New Jersey,
Security Aluminum Window Mfg. Corp. v. Lehman Assoc. Inc., 260 A.2d 248 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970); New Mexico, Robertson v. Carmel Builders Real
Estate, 92 P.3d 653, 659 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003); New York, Craven v. Bloomingdale,
64 N.E. 169 (N.Y. 1902); North Dakota, John Deere Co. v. Nygard Equip., Inc.,
225 N.W.2d 80 (N.D. 1974); Ohio, Tracy v. Athens & Pomeroy Coal & Land Co.,
152 N.E. 641 (Ohio 1926); Rhode Island, Conti v. Winters, 136 A.2d 622 (R.I.
1957); Texas, Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967);
Vermont, Shortle v. Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 399 A.2d 517 (Vt. 1979); Virginia,
Freeman v. Sproles, 131 S.E.2d 410 (Va. 1963); West Virginia, Addair v. Huffmann,
195 S.E.2d 739 (W. Va. 1973); Wisconsin, Garcia v. Sampson’s, Inc., 103 N.W.2d
565 (Wis. 1960); Wyoming, Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121 (Wyo. 1981).
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
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the manner of the act, or (b) the agent was unfit and the principal
or a managerial agent was reckless in employing or retaining him,
or (c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was
acting in the scope of employment, or (d) the principal or a
managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved the act.141
A court must individually examine the four criteria of culpability provided
in the Restatement to assess the functionality and fairness of each.
Part (a) of the Restatement provides that a court can hold employers
that explicitly authorize the “doing and the manner of the act” vicariously
liable for punitive damages.142 For example, in Denver & R G R Co. v.
Harris, a railroad company directed its employees to launch an assault on
the property of a competing railroad company.143 As a result of the
employer’s direct authorization of the wrongful act, the court held the
employer vicariously liable for punitive damages.144 Part (a) of the
Restatement is the most functionally sound and fair of all of the factors
because an employer that authorizes an act is the most culpable party for
the act other than the actor himself.145
Under the criteria of part (b) of the Restatement, an employer can be
vicariously liable for punitive damages if he knowingly employs or retains
an employee that possesses a character trait causing the injury that gave
rise to the punitive damages.146 The Restatement uses the term
“characteristic,”147 in explaining the criterion. In application, however, the
criterion is based upon past conduct rather than a true character trait.148
The case Cates v. Darland illustrates the “characteristic” criterion, a case
in which an unhappy customer sued a car dealership because of an
employee misrepresenting the mileage on a vehicle by turning back the
odometer.149 The same employee had previously engaged in the same

141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909.
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Denver & R G R Co v. Harris, 122 U.S. 597, 605–07 (1887).
144. Id. at 610.
145. See, e.g., id. at 605–07 (finding a railroad company employer vicariously
liable for punitive damages for directing its employees to storm the property of a
competing railroad company).
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909.
147. Id. § 909 cmt. b.
148. See, e.g., Cates v. Darland, 537 P.2d 336 (Okla. 1975) (finding a car
salesman employee’s past conduct of turning back odometers a characteristic that,
when known by the employer, allowed the employer to be held vicariously liable
for the punitive damages arising from that characteristic).
149. Id. at 337.
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conduct by turning back the odometer on other vehicles.150 The court in
Cates found the employer was aware of the employee’s previous conduct
and thus held the employer vicariously liable for punitive damages.151 A
“characteristic”152 under part (b) of the Restatement is therefore not
necessarily a character trait, but rather a specific instance of previous
conduct similar to the conduct giving rise to the award of punitive
damages.153
The most straightforward application of this criterion to Louisiana law
is demonstrated in the following hypothetical:
An employer hires or retains an employee who the employer
knows to be a recovering alcoholic. If, during a work errand, that
employee caused damage to another while driving under the
influence of alcohol, Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.4 would
allow recovery of punitive damages.154
Under the criterion of culpability part (b) of the Restatement outlines,
the employer in the above hypothetical would be vicariously liable for
punitive damages resulting from injury the employee caused while driving
intoxicated.155
Although the criteria in part (b) encourages employers to be especially
diligent in hiring employees, it de-incentivizes employers from employing
persons suffering from alcoholism, drug addiction, and other physical and
mental issues.156 Moreover, an employee would become seemingly “unfit”
for retention if convicted of a DWI.157 Under the criteria in part (b),
employers that seek complete insulation for liability would be forced to
deem whole groups of people unemployable, creating unnecessary

150. Id. at 33738.
151. Id. at 336.
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 cmt. b.
153. Darland, 537 P.2d at 336.
154. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.4 (2019).
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909. See also Kurn v. Radencic, 141
P.2d 580, 582 (1943) (holding that an employer was vicariously liable for punitive
damages arising from an employee that had a history of aggression and caused
damages to another because of that aggression).
156. A broad application of part (b) would likely hold an employer vicariously
liable for punitive damages if the employer was aware of an employee with
alcoholism and that employee caused damage as a result of driving while
intoxicated. Consequently, the employer, to limit liability, would likely avoid
employing individuals with such characteristics.
157. Darland, 537 P.2d 336.
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financial burdens on the state.158 Some jurisdictions follow part (b) of the
Restatement to force employers to “exercise closer control” over their
employees.159 Because the approach in part (b) incentivizes employers to
select employees carefully and based upon past conduct,160 it would be
difficult for employers to assess with a great degree of accuracy whether
a potential employee would later cause an injury allowing an award of
punitive damages, as past conduct is not necessarily indicative of future
behavior.161 If a court were to include part (b) of the Restatement in a
vicarious liability analysis, the court should consider the specific facts of
the case to determine the employer’s culpability rather than broadly apply
part (b).
If an employee acting in a managerial capacity commits an act that
gives rise to punitive damages, his employer would be vicariously liable
under part (c) of the Restatement.162 An employer’s culpability differs,
however, when a low-level manager commits a bad act versus a senior
executive.163 A court would understandably hold a company vicariously
liable for the acts of a high-level executive, but not necessarily a local
assistant manager, because the former speaks and acts for the company in

158. Employers often consider potential liability when deciding whether or not
to hire employees. See Kenneth I. Sondik, Ban the Box Leaves Employers Liable
for Negligent-Hiring Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes
.com/roomfordebate/2016/04/13/should-a-jail-record-be-an-employers-first-impres
sion/ban-the-box-leaves-employers-liable-for-negligent-hiring-lawsuits [https://per
ma.cc/HGF8-J3Q8]. If a court held an employer liable for punitive damages arising
from every action of an employee because of a characteristic of the employee of which
the employer was aware, the employer would be more likely to forego hiring the
employee to limit liability.
159. KEETON, supra note 122, at 13.
160. Darland, 537 P.2d 336.
161. For example, even if an employer conducted thorough and rigorous
background checks, it is possible that an employee could pass all preliminary
checks and then subsequently make a poor decision that causes damage to another.
162. The Restatement provides the following as an illustration of this criterion
of culpability:
A, a corporation owning a series of retail stores, employs B as operations
manager to supervise the management of the units. While visiting a unit
B discovers facts that lead him to believe erroneously that one of the
clerks has been stealing. He directs the local manager to imprison the
clerk. In the ensuing interview, he permits the local manager to use
outrageous means of intimidation. In the clerk’s action against the
corporation, punitive damages can properly be awarded.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
163. White v. Ultramar, Inc., 981 P.2d 944, 952 (1999).

1230

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

a way that the latter cannot.164 In White v. Ultramar, the Supreme Court of
California addressed the issue of whether a lower-level managerial
employee should qualify as a managerial employee for the purposes of part
(c) of the Restatement.165 The White court reasoned, “A rule defining
managing agent as any supervisor who can hire or fire employees, but who
does not have substantial authority over decisions that ultimately determine
corporate policy, effectively allows punitive damage liability without proof
of anything more than simple tort liability, which we have long recognized
is insufficient.”166 As the court in White observed, holding an employer
vicariously liable for punitive damages for the actions of any employee in
any managerial capacity would create far too broad a standard.167
Like part (b), part (c) of the Restatement incentivizes employers to
avoid retaining or hiring unfit employees.168 The criterion provided in part
(c) uses fear of potential punitive damage liability to incentivize employers
to exercise higher levels of caution and care when hiring managers and
promoting employees to managerial status.169 Nevertheless, part (c)
imposes an even higher burden on employers for evaluating candidates for
managerial positions, no matter what level of authority the managerial
position may involve.170 Employers, however, likely would not spend the
same amount of time, effort, and resources evaluating the character and
background of a candidate for a position as a local assistant manager as
they would for a position as the chief financial officer of a company.171
Part (d) of the Restatement is the last consideration under the Restatement
approach, providing that courts may hold employers vicariously liable for
punitive damages in situations in which the employer ratifies or expresses
approval for the act that gave rise to the punitive damages.172 “Expresses
approval” is analogous to the retroactive “authorization” part (a) of the
Restatement explains.173 As in part (a), this criterion serves the purpose of
punitive damages: to punish and deter bad conduct.174 Upon ratification, the
one ratifying is subject to tort liability to the person the purported agent

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See id. at 952–53.
Id.
Id.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
See generally id.
See generally id.
See generally id.
Id.
See discussion supra Part III.B.
KEETON, supra note 122, at 9.
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harmed.175 An overt act expressing approval or affirmation of the
employee’s act would typically perfect ratification;176 however, silence may
constitute ratification.177 The Restatement goes on to explain that merely
failing to dismiss an employee does not amount to ratification of the bad
act.178 Nevertheless, the Restatement does not consider whether failing to
reprimand an employee or express disapproval for a bad act is considered
ratification through inaction.179 Because the criteria of ratification aligns
with the aim of punitive damages and does not extend vicarious liability for
punitive damages to employers without culpability, courts should use the
criteria in every vicarious liability analysis for punitive damages. With
respect to a question of ratification by silence or inaction during a vicarious
liability analysis, the court should have the discretion to make such a
judgment.
C. No Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages
Although a hardline rule precluding vicarious liability for punitive
damages truly embraces the restrictive civilian view on punitive damages,
it allows employers like the Calcasieu Parish School Board to avoid all
instances of vicarious liability for punitive damages, even in situations in

175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 218 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 cmt. b.
177. The Restatement describes ratification through silence as such:
Silence under such circumstances that, according to the ordinary
experience and habits of men, one would naturally be expected to speak
if he did not consent, is evidence from which assent can be inferred. Such
inference may be made although the purported principal had no
knowledge that the other party would rely upon the supposed authority
of the agent; his knowledge of such fact, however, coupled with his
silence, would ordinarily justify an inference of assent by him. Whether
or not such an inference is to be drawn is a question for the jury, unless
the case is so clear that reasonable men could come to but one
conclusion.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 94 cmt. a.
178. Id. § 217 cmt. b.
179. Consider the following scenario: An employee works for a retail store and
apprehends a suspected shoplifter. Upon apprehension, the employer watches the
employee bring the suspect to an office for questioning. The employee questions
the suspect, finds no wrongdoing and releases him. The suspected shoplifter then
files suit for false imprisonment, which, for the purposes of this scenario, allows
recovery for punitive damages. The employer may have ratified the employee’s
action through silence or inaction.
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which the employer was overtly complicit in the wrongdoing.180 If
Louisiana wishes to embrace a true civilian approach to punitive damages,
it should repeal all statutes that provide for recovery of punitive damages
rather than merely restrict plaintiffs’ recovery through vicarious
liability.181 If the aim of punitive damages is to punish wrongdoers and
deter bad behavior,182 and Louisiana intends to allow plaintiffs to pursue
punitive damages under certain statutes, then Louisiana should adopt an
approach that allows courts to assess punitive damages against employers
through vicarious liability when employers are especially culpable for the
injury that gave rise to the punitive damages. Although the strict liability
standard applies to employer liability for compensatory damages,183
vicarious liability for punitive damages should involve a more nuanced
approach.
IV. LOUISIANA’S SOLUTION: A NOVEL, TWO-STEP BASELINE TEST
The ideal test for punitive damages in a vicarious liability analysis
would completely ignore any notion of strict liability. Instead, the test
would incorporate all of the criteria from the Restatement of Torts, but not
use the criteria in their broadest application as an automatic trigger for
vicarious liability.184 Using this novel test, a court would conduct the
vicarious liability analysis for punitive damages in two separate steps.
In the first step, the four criteria from the Restatement would act as a
baseline for a vicarious liability analysis.185 If an employer meets any of
the criteria, then the employer would meet the baseline. Once an employer
meets the baseline—the minimum threshold of culpability—then the court
could proceed to the second step to determine the employer’s individual
fault and whether vicarious liability for punitive damages is warranted in
that particular case.
The second step would determine whether vicarious liability is
applicable based upon how culpable the employer was in the specific
instance that caused the plaintiff harm. The court would conduct this inquiry
180. See supra Introduction. Although this hardline approach would preclude
the recovery of punitive damages through vicarious liability, a plaintiff could still
recover compensatory damages from the employer through vicarious liability and
the plaintiff could still bring a direct action against the employer for negligent
hiring, training, retention, or supervision.
181. See discussion supra Part I.A.
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
183. NORMAN, supra note 50, § 14:3.
184. See supra Part III.B.
185. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909.
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on a case-by-case basis, applying the specific facts of the case to determine
how culpable the employer was based upon the employer’s acts or
omissions. Courts would conduct the second step using their discretion in
determining whether or not the employer’s acts or omissions contributed to
the plaintiff’s injuries such that the employer’s culpability warrants an
assessment of vicarious punitive damages.
This two-step solution would not prevent plaintiffs from becoming
whole because punitive damages are a “supra-compensatory remedy,”186
and courts award them not in place of, but in addition to any award of
compensatory damages.187 Similar to the Restatement’s criteria, which do
not apply to double or treble damage statutes,188 the solution should not
apply to instances of liability arising from double or treble damage
statutes,189 which are not “supra-compensatory” in nature.190 Although the
baseline test will restrict vicarious liability for punitive damages, such a
restriction will not decrease or eliminate a plaintiff’s ability to be fully
compensated for his injury through compensatory damages.191 Perhaps
most importantly, this solution would serve the purpose of punitive
damages—to punish and deter—since only the most culpable employers
would be vicariously liable for punitive damages.192
A. Using the Restatement Criteria as a Baseline Test
Under part (a) of the Restatement, courts would hold employers
vicariously liable for punitive damages when employers explicitly
authorized the doing and the manner of the employee’s act.193 For
example, an application of Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.4 would
resemble the following: An employer hosts a work event that involves
alcohol for employees’ consumption. After the work event, the employer
instructs the employee to complete a work-related errand that involves

186. Sharkey, supra note 25, at 486.
187. KEETON, supra note 122, at 9.
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
189. For examples of fixed amount punitive damage statutes, see, e.g., LA.
REV. STAT. § 46:2163 (2019) (providing that individuals subject to human
trafficking may recover treble damages); id. § 3:4278.1 (providing damages for
landowners whose trees were intentionally cut down in the amount of three times
market price).
190. Sharkey, supra note 25, at 486.
191. See KEETON, supra note 122, at 9.
192. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (AM. LAW INST.
1979).
193. See id.
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vehicular travel.194 The employer, knowing that the employee has
consumed alcohol, has explicitly authorized the doing and the manner of
the act. If in this scenario the employee causes injury to another as a result
of his driving while intoxicated, this criterion would allow the employer
to be held vicariously liable for any resulting punitive damages.195 As the
behavior outlined in part (a) of the Restatement is the express authorization
of the doing and the manner of the bad act, it is likely that a court would
find the employer culpable enough to be held vicariously liable for
punitive damages whenever the baseline test for part (a) is satisfied.196
Part (b) of the Restatement would allow a court to hold an employer
vicariously liable for punitive damages if he knowingly employed or
retained an employee who possessed a character trait that caused the injury
giving rise to the punitive damages.197 Part (b) in its broadest application
would allow a court to hold an employer vicariously liable if the employee
had a history of behavior similar to the behavior that caused the damage.198
Using the criterion as a baseline for a vicarious liability analysis, a court,
finding that an employer met the requirements of part (b), should further
make a determination of the culpability of the employer.199 Such a caseby-case determination would allow courts to hold culpable employers
liable for punitive damages but protect employers who did not commit
wrong acts.
Part (c) would allow a court to hold an employer vicariously liable for
punitive damages in situations in which the employee who caused the
injury was in a managerial capacity.200 Again, using a baseline test, when
the employee was in a managerial capacity, a court would proceed with a
determination of the employer’s culpability. A court should consider the
level of authority a supervisor or managerial employee possessed,
allowing a better determination of whether the employee’s status allowed
him to act as the employer.201 Just as the court in White observed, the mere
presence of a person in holding any managerial capacity does not itself
justify holding an employer vicariously liable for the individual’s
194. This hypothetical is loosely based off of the facts of Curtis v. Rome. 735
So. 2d 822, 826 (La. Ct. App. 1999), writ denied sub nom. Rambo v. Rome, 748
So. 2d 441 (La. 1999) (finding an employer that provided alcohol that intoxicated
the defendant vicariously liable for punitive damages).
195. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909.
196. See generally id.
197. Id.
198. Cates v. Darland, 537 P.2d 336 (Okla. 1975).
199. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909.
200. Id.
201. See generally White v. Ultramar, Inc., 981 P.2d 944 (1999).
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actions.202 Using the baseline test, a court should distinguish between the
culpability of an employer when the employee was a low-level manager
and when the employee was a senior executive.
Part (d) of the Restatement would allow a court to hold employers
vicariously liable for punitive damages when the employer ratifies or
expresses approval for the act.203 It is unlikely that in a scenario similar to
the DWI hypothetical, the employer would express approval for the acts
of the employee; however, if an employer ratifies or expresses approval
for a bad act, it is appropriate for the employer to be vicariously liable for
punitive damages.204 As the behavior outlined in part (d) is the ratification
or approval of the bad act, a court would likely find the employer culpable
enough to be held vicariously liable for punitive damages whenever the
baseline test for part (d) is satisfied.205
The baseline test would allow employers to be punished for bad
conduct, such as authorizing or ratifying an employee’s bad act, and overly
reckless behavior, such as retaining an employee who has been convicted
of several DWI offenses since beginning employment in a position that
involves vehicular travel. It would not allow, however, vicarious liability
for punitive damages to extend to employers who are not culpable in some
way for the bad act. Using the Restatement criteria as a baseline for a
vicarious liability analysis would significantly restrict vicarious liability
for punitive damages, and employers could more easily limit liability for
punitive damages through protective measures.206
B. Application of the Two-Step Baseline Test to Lacoste v. Crochet
The court in Lacoste found the employer, Kelley, vicariously liable
for the intoxicated truck driver, Crochet, whose actions gave rise to
punitive damages.207 Under the proposed baseline test, the outcome of
Lacoste would depend on certain facts not clearly explained in the court’s
opinion.208 Crochet was previously convicted of a DWI.209 It is unclear,
however, whether Kelley knew of the previous conviction, and if so, when
it took place.210 If Kelley knew of Crochet’s previous DWI, then that
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909.
See generally id.
See generally id.
See generally id.
Lacoste v. Crochet, 751 So. 2d 998 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
See supra Introduction.
Crochet, 751 So. 2d at 100001.
Id.
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would satisfy the criterion in part (b) and the baseline of step one.211 The
court would proceed to step two and conduct a fact-based consideration to
determine Kelley’s culpability based upon its acts or omissions. The court
could consider factors such as whether Kelley ensured that Crochet
received court-ordered or volunteer counseling as a result of the DWI, or
whether Kelley administered alcohol tests to Crochet as a result of the
previous offense. Taking factors such as these into consideration, the court,
in its discretion, could determine the level of culpability that Kelley had in
Crochet’s acts, and whether, if at all, Kelley’s culpability contributed to the
plaintiff’s injuries warranting vicarious liability for punitive damages.
C. Application of the Two-Step Baseline Test to Gillespie v. Calcasieu
School Board
In Gillespie, the court found that the Calcasieu School Board was not
vicariously liable for punitive damages.212 Using the baseline test, the
court likely would have held the Calcasieu School Board vicariously liable
for punitive damages. The Calcasieu School Board’s awareness of
Duhon’s previous sexual misconduct with a student would satisfy the
criterion set forth in part (b) of the Restatement and meet the baseline of
step one.213 The court would then proceed to step two and use its discretion
when considering the School Board’s acts or omissions to determine the
School Board’s culpability.214 Given the School Board’s knowledge of
Duhon’s previous activity,215 and the School Board’s disregard of the
opinion of Duhon’s former principal,216 a court using the baseline test
would likely determine that the School Board’s culpability contributed to
the plaintiff’s injuries and hold the School Board vicariously liable for the
punitive damages arising from Duhon’s conduct.
CONCLUSION
Tort law in Louisiana is one of the most complex parts of Louisiana’s
mixed legal system.217 Use of the two-step baseline test proposed in Part
211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909.
212. Gillespie v. Calcasieu Par. Sch. Bd., 179 So. 3d 966 (La. Ct. App. 2015),
writ denied, 187 So. 3d 470 (La. 2016).
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909.
214. See generally id.
215. Gillespie, 179 So. 3d at 967.
216. Id.
217. For example, vicarious liability and punitive damages, both the focus of
this Comment, derive from Common Law doctrine rather than Civilian principles.

2019]

COMMENT

1237

IV would embrace this mixed law system by allowing courts to remain
mindful of the civil law’s restrictive nature on punitive damages but still
provide a balanced version of the criteria of the Restatement, a common
law standard.218 Adopting the baseline test modeled on the Restatement of
Torts would provide Louisiana courts with a streamlined test courts could
use during vicarious liability analyses for punitive damages.219 This
solution would resolve the current contradicting circuit precedent and
generally restrict the availability of punitive damages through vicarious
liability, adhering to Louisiana’s civilian heritage and providing an avenue
of recovery when employers were complicit in or considerably culpable
for the wrongful conduct.
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